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Do R&D Subsidies Support Innovation or Imitation?  
Evidence from Four EU Countries 
 





 This paper presents an empirical analysis of the eff cts of public R&D subsi-
dies on the innovative activities of private firms in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, and Portugal. We investigate whether public R&D subsidies make 
firms’ activities more innovative. We measure these ff cts using firm-level data 
from the 2010 and 2012 Community Innovation Survey and estimated the effects 
by propensity score matching. We find that the subsidies do not fully crowd out 
private sources of R&D expenditure in any of these countries. However, there is 
a substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the subsidies on firms’ innovative-
ness. R&D subsidies do support true innovations in the Czech Republic and 
Germany, but they enhance only imitations in Bulgaria nd Portugal. 
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 Governments all around the world strive to increase the R&D intensity of 
their economies. For example, one of the European Union’s 2020 targets is to 
have 3% of European GDP invested into R&D activities (EC, 2010). Govern-
ments support investment into private R&D using twoconventional tools: direct 
subsidies and tax incentives. Public subsidies for private R&D activities are 
based on solid theoretical arguments dating back to Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962). One traditional argument states that R&D investment creates positive 
technological spillovers, motivating other companies to free ride. This leads 
firms to underinvest in their own R&D activities. This lack of investment is  
                                                          
 *  Rostislav  STANĚK – Michal  KVASNIČKA – Ondřej  KRČÁL, Masaryk University, Fa-
culty of Economics and Administration, Department of Economics, Lipová 507/41a, 602 00 Brno, 
Czech Republic; e-mail: Rostislav.Stanek@econ.muni.cz;  Michal.Kvasnicka@econ.muni.cz; Ondrej. 
Krcal@econ.muni.cz 
910 
especially severe with highly innovative R&D projects with high risk and high 
potential gain for the society, as firms capturing only a small part of the overall 
gain might not be willing to incur the risks. 
 Even though the benefits of public R&D subsidies are well grounded in theory, 
the positive effect of such subsidies cannot be takn for granted. Firms always 
have incentives to apply for public subsidies, even if the R&D project would still 
be conducted without it. The principal question to be answered when evaluating 
the effect of a public subsidy is what the firm’s R&D activities would have been 
if it had not received that subsidy. There are two different channels through 
which public subsidies may affect the firm’s behavior. Public subsidies may 
increase the amount of R&D expenditure, or they may provide incentives to 
engage in more innovative R&D activities. Previous literature decisively shows 
that public subsidies do indeed increase the spending on R&D, i.e. there is not 
a full crowding out effect on private investment. Moreover, it seems that the 
increased spending spurs the development of new products. However, less is 
known regarding whether the new products are true innovations, i.e. products 
and services created first in the world, or mere imitations, i.e. products and ser-
vices that are new only for the firm or its local market. 
 The main goal of this paper is to investigate whether public subsidies support 
radical innovations or mere imitations. The former is typically defined as a stra-
tegy when a firm invests substantially in R&D and aims to be the first to bring 
the innovative product. The latter is characterized as producing pure clones or 
products which are only incrementally different from products existing else-
where. Compared to imitation, innovations have higher potential to push the 
technological frontier of a firm or even a sector, and create positive technologi-
cal spillovers.  
 We use data from Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) 2010 and 2012, 
which ask several questions that allow us to address our research question. We 
estimate the effect of public subsidies by propensity score matching, a non-pa-
rametric method that is a standard procedure in this strand of literature. We esti-
mate the effects of the R&D subsidies in four countries: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, and Portugal. The countries were s l cted on the basis of 
data availability; other countries in the CIS datase s do not provide all the neces-
sary data.  
 The comparison of the effect of R&D subsidies in these countries provides 
the second contribution of the paper. The current literature offers some evidence 
that R&D subsidies induce more radical innovations. However, this evidence is 
limited to the most developed European countries. Our sample includes Germany, 
but also less developed countries, two of which were part of the Eastern Bloc 
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(Czech Republic and Bulgaria) and one western less d veloped country (Portugal). 
By estimating the effect of R&D subsidies in these countries, we show whether 
and to what extent R&D subsidies induce more radical innovations, even in less 
developed countries.  
 The paper is organized as follows: In the next secion, we will briefly discuss 
recent empirical studies of the impact of R&D subsidies. The methodology and 
data are presented in Section 2. The main analysis is conducted in Section 3. The 
last section provides a discussion of the results. 
 
 
1.  Literature Review 
 
 Many empirical studies have assessed the impact of public subsidies on the 
amount R&D investment. The main interest of these studies is the so called 
crowding-out hypothesis which postulates that public subsidies do not increase 
R&D spending. Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) provide a meta-analysis of studies 
on the crowding-out effect of R&D subsidies. They found that more than 60% of 
76 micro-level studies reject the crowding-out effect, which means that public 
subsidies increase the firms’ spending on R&D. More recent studies, not included 
in the review by Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014), are ev n more likely to reject the 
crowding-out hypothesis (see Carboni, 2011; Cerulli and Potì, 2012; Hottenrott 
and Lopes-Bento, 2014, for examples of studies that reject the hypothesis). The 
crowding-out hypothesis was also rejected for the Cz ch Republic during years 
2000 – 2008 (Vokoun, 2016). The majority of these studies use CIS data (e.g. Aerts 
and Schmidt, 2008; Clausen, 2009; Cerulli and Potì, 2012; Hud and Hussinger, 
2015) or survey data with a similar structure (e.g. Bérubé and Mohnen, 2009; 
Huergo, Trenado and Ubierna, 2016).  
 In this paper, we are mainly interested in whether public subsidies encourage 
firms to undertake more innovative projects. Encouraging first-to-the-world in-
novations rather than mere imitations is more desirable because it generates 
higher value for the global economy, which can be, to some extent, captured by 
the innovators. This could be even more beneficial in those countries in our 
sample whose institutions do not sufficiently support innovation, such as the 
Czech Republic, Portugal, and Bulgaria,1 because it might create positive spillo-
vers on innovativeness of other firms in the same economy, for example through 
corporate culture (Tellis, Prabhu and Chandy, 2009).  
                                                          
 1 A widely used measure of the innovativeness of an economy is the Bloomberg Innovation 
Index 2018 in which the Czech Republic ranks 28th, Portugal 30th, and Bulgaria 41th (see <https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-22/south-korea-tops-global-innovation-ranking-again 
-as-u-s-falls>.) [Accessed on 6/8/2018.] 
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 Studies of the impact of R&D subsidies on the innovativeness of R&D acti-
vity are relatively rare. Bérubé and Mohnen (2009) use survey data from Cana-
dian firms to investigate whether subsidized firms engage in more innovative 
projects. Their results show that subsidized firms introduced more world-first 
innovations.  
 In a similar line of research, Bronzini and Piselli (2016) evaluate the effect 
of subsidy programs implemented in Northern Italy on the number of patent 
applications. Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014) investigated the same research 
question using data from Germany. Both studies findthat subsidy programs  
increased the likelihood of a firm’s applying for a p tent. Neicu, Teirlinck 
and Kelchtermans (2016) use survey data on Belgian firms to show that R&D 
subsidies induce firms to invest more into research a tivities than in develop-
ment activities. Using a representative firm-level dataset covering the period 
between 1999 and 2011 of the Swiss innovation survey, B ck, Lopes-Bento and 
Schenker-Wicki (2016) hypothesize that public subsidie  affect radical and in-
cremental innovations differently. They use sales prcentages of newly intro-
duced or innovated products as measures of the succs of radical or incremental 
innovation and show that public subsidies only increase the success of radical 
innovations.  
 Taken together, these studies provide some evidence that R&D subsidies may 
induce more radical innovative activities. Nevertheless, the geographical scope 
of studies evaluating this effect of public R&D support is limited to the most 
developed European regions (Northern Italy, Belgium, Switzerland) and Canada. 
Little is known regarding whether public subsidies induce more radical innova-
tions even in less-developed countries. This paper contributes to the current 
knowledge of the effect of public R&D subsidies by providing firm-level evi-
dence of the effect for several European countries. Countries in our sample are 
different with respect to the level of economic development and sophistication of 
the production process.  
 The sophistication of the production process is measured in World bank sur-
vey2 on the 7 point scale, where 1 means „production uses labor-intensive pro-
cesses or old technology“ and 7 stand for „production uses sophisticated and 
knowledge-intensive processes“. The index values for countries in the year 2012 
were the following: Germany 6.38, Czech Republic 4.66, Portugal 4.26, Bulgaria 
3.37. Due to these differences, we are able to show whether the R&D subsidies 
induce innovative activities to the same extent in more developed countries as in 
less-developed European countries. 
                                                          
 2 <https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/inv.prod.soph?country=CZE&indicator=555&viz 
=line_chart&years=2007,2017>. [Accessed on 3/6/2018.] 
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2.  Data and Estimation Procedure 
 
 We use data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 2010 and 2012. 
We focus on manufacturing firms (NACE group C) that attempted a product 
innovation in the examined years and were located in one of the following four 
countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Portugal. The other 
countries included in the CIS datasets do not provide all the necessary variables 
or have too few complete observations. 
 Following Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), we divided manuf cturing into four 
groups: resource intensive manufacturing C1 (NACE codes 10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 
21, 22, and 23), labor intensive manufacturing C2 (codes 13, 14, 31, 32, and 33), 
scale intensive manufacturing C3 (codes 18, 24, 25, 29, and 30), and science 
based and specialized manufacturing C4 (codes 26 to 28). We dropped all in-
complete observations and observations in which the firms were not sure about 
the novelty of their products. Table 1 shows the numbers of observations and the 
share of firms that received a subsidy in each country, year, and industry group. 
 
T a b l e  1  
Number of Complete Observations in Each Country, Year, and Industry Group.  
The Share of Firms that Received a Subsidy is in Parentheses 
Country/year C1 C2 C3 C4 
Bulgaria 2010 369 (10.8%) 165 (8.5%) 118 (22%) 137 (27.7%) 
Bulgaria 2012 347 (18.2%)   191 (12.6%)    118 (16.1%) 134 (26.9%) 
Czech Republic 2010 230 (26.5%)     89 (32.6%)    114 (40.4%) 130 (40.8%) 
Czech Republic 2012 261 (35.6%)   117 (27.4%)    141 (39.7%) 149 (49.7%) 
Germany 2010 401 (26.9%)   189 (31.7%)    223 (32.3%) 447 (52.6%) 
Germany 2012 309 (33.7%)   145 (39.3%)    167 (41.3%) 364 (53.8%) 
Portugal 2010 337 (39.5%)   158 (33.5%) 217 (35%) 145 (34.5%) 
Portugal 2012 312 (47.1%)   146 (46.6%)    184 (40.8%) 120 (47.5%) 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, prepared by the authors. 
 
 We use the information whether a firm developed a product that is new only 
to its country of residence, new to the EU, or new to orld as the main outcome 
variables (variables INPFDC, INPDFE, INPDFW from the CIS dataset). This 
allows us to explore whether public R&D subsidies support innovations or imita-
tions. If they support radical innovations, we should observe a large and statisti-
cally significant treatment effect in the development of products that are new to 
the world. If, on the other hand, they support only imitations, we should observe 
a significant treatment effect only in the development of products that are new 
only to the firms’ home countries. In the unlikely scenario in which the subsidies 
do not generate any product innovations at all, all these treatment effects should 
be insignificant. 
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 We measure treatment with a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm 
has been awarded at least one public subsidy by any government (variables 
FUNLOC, FUNGMT, FUNEU, and FUNRTD from the CIS data3). 
 Our aim is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (TTα ), 
which is the difference between the outcomes of firms that received subsidies 
and the outcomes that the same firms would achieve if they were not awarded 
the subsidies. The treatment effect can be expressed by the following equation  
 
( ) ( )cE 1 E | 1tTT y | s y sα = = − =  
 
where ty  is the actual outcome variable (e.g. R&D expenditure) of the treated 
firm and cy  is the potential outcome variable if the treated firm had not been 
treated. The variable s indicates the firm’s treatment status: s = 1 denotes a treated 
firm, and s = 0 denotes a non-treated firm. The outcome of a tre ted firm 
( )E 1ty | s=  is directly observable as it can be calculated as a sample mean of 
the outcome variable in the group of treated firms. On the other hand, the coun-
terfactual situation ( )cE | 1y s=  cannot be simply calculated from non-treated 
firms due to the non-random assignment of treatments. The fundamental prob-
lem is therefore the estimation of this counterfactu l situation. 
 
 In order to address this problem, we use a propensity score matching estima-
tor (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Many studies have rec ntly applied matching 
estimators to evaluate innovation policies (e.g. Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Bérubé 
and Mohnen, 2009; Carboni, 2011; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Hud and 
Hussinger, 2015). The main idea of the propensity score matching estimator is to 
construct a correct sample counterpart of the treated firms by matching each 
treated firm with a non-treated firm with similar characteristics. It is assumed 
that the treatment is randomly assigned to firms with the same set of exogenous 
characteristics X. Conditioning on variables X therefore controls for selection 
bias due to observable differences between treated and non-treated firms. Conse-
quently, the treatment effect can be calculated as  
 
( ) ( )cE 1, E | 0, tTT y | s X x y s X xα = = = − = =  
 
 Propensity score matching reduces the set of observabl  characteristics X into 
a single index which is the conditional probability that a given firm belongs to 
the treatment group given the characteristics X. Firms with the closest propensity 
                                                          
 3 These variables show whether a firm received a subsidy from local or regional authorities 
(FUNLOC), from central governments (FUNGMT), from the European Union (FUNEU), and from 
the EU 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technical Development (FUNRTD). 
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score are then matched into pairs. In some situations, it can also be appropriate 
to impose additional restrictions based on some subset of X. For example, one 
may want to match together only firms from the same industry or firms of the 
same size.  
 The matching procedure used in this paper proceeds in the following steps: 
1. We define and estimate the logit model that explains whether a firm re-
ceives a direct or indirect subsidy. Our control variables include industry group, 
two measures of firm size (turnover and number of employees4), whether the 
firm is part of an enterprise group, and where the headquarters is located, and 
variables measuring the geographical scope of the firm’s relevant market.5 We 
include these variables because previous studies show that likelihood of getting 
an R&D subsidy depends on the firm size (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hottenrott 
and Lopes-Bento, 2014), export-orientation (Huergo, Trenado and Ubierna, 2016; 
Hud and Hussinger, 2015) and whether a firm is part of an enterprise group (Hud 
and Hussinger, 2015). The exact specification and results of the model are pre-
sented in the Appendix A. Based on this model, we compute propensity scores 
for each firm. 
2. We divide the firms in two groups. The first group is the treated group (s= 1), 
which contains firms that received subsidies. The second group is the non-treated 
group (s = 0), which contains firms that invest in R&D activities and do not re-
ceive subsidies.  
3. Each firm in the treatment group is matched to a non-treated firm in the 
same country, the same industry, with the same firm s ze measured by the num-
ber-of-employees category, and the same survey year (2010 or 2012). The firm 
with the minimum distance between propensity scores is selected from this sub-
set as a control firm. If the propensity score distance is greater than one quarter 
of the standard deviation, we drop the observation. 
4. Using the matched sample, the treatment effect is calculated as the mean 
difference of the outcome variable between treated firms and control firms. 
 
1 1







 = − 
 
   
 
 As the same firm may appear more than once in the control group, we follow 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) to calculate a consistent estimator of the standard 
error of the treatment effect. 
                                                          
 4 Firms are divided in three categories according to the number of employees: with less than 
50 employees, with 50 to 249 employees, and with 250 employees or more.  
 5 Here we differentiate between local, national, European, and global relevant markets. 
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 After the matching, we do not observe any significant differences between 
the treated and control observations with regard to control variables. This indi-
cates that our matching procedure was successful. Therefore, significant differ-
ences in the mean value of the outcome variable after the matching can be inter-
preted causally.  
 Table 2 illustrates this statement for the sample of Czech firms in 2012. 
While the firms in the treated and non-treated groups differ in many respects 
before matching, there are no significant differences in any of the covariates 
after the matching. Similar tables for all countries and time periods in the sample 
can be found in Appendix B. 
 
T a b l e  2  
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for the Czech Republic in 2012 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after  
Industry group C1   0.407 (0.242)   0.365 (0.233)   0.366 (0.232)   0.366 (0.232) 
Industry group C2   0.206 (0.164)   0.125*** (0.11)   0.126 (0.11)   0.126 (0.11) 
Industry group C3   0.206 (0.164)   0.22 (0.172)   0.22 (0.172)   0.22 (0.172) 
Industry group C4   0.182 (0.149)   0.29*** (0.207)   0.287 (0.205)   0.287 (0.205) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.494 (0.251)   0.443 (0.248)   0.411 (0.242)   0.445 (0.247) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.126 (0.11) 
 
  0.255*** (0.191) 
 
  0.272 (0.198) 
 
  0.252 (0.188) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.3 (0.211)   0.239* (0.183)   0.244 (0.185)   0.24 (0.182) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.08 (0.074) 
 
  0.063 (0.059) 
   
  0.073 (0.068) 
 
  0.063 (0.059) 
Log(turnover) 16.001 (3.925) 16.757*** (2.797) 16.803 (3.405) 16.749 (2.779) 
Size under 50   0.337 (0.224)   0.169*** (0.141)   0.173 (0.143)   0.169 (0.141) 
Size 50 to 249   0.32 (0.218)   0.333 (0.223)   0.318 (0.217)   0.335 (0.223) 
Size 250 and more   0.344 (0.226)   0.498*** (0.251)   0.509 (0.25)   0.496 (0.25) 
Local relevant market   0.741 (0.192)   0.792 (0.165)   0.814 (0.152)   0.791 (0.165) 
National relevant market   0.886 (0.101)   0.941** (0.056)   0.953 (0.045)   0.941 (0.056) 
European relevant market   0.835 (0.138)   0.925*** (0.069)   0.925 (0.069)   0.925 (0.069) 
Global relevant market   0.523 (0.25)   0.702*** (0.21)   0.663 (0.223)   0.701 (0.21) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy; 
the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statistically signi-
ficant differences between the respective control and treatment values are denoted by asterisks: * forp < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
 
 
3.  Results 
 
 The estimated average treatment effects of public R&D subsidies on R&D 
expenditure and product innovations of the treated firms in each country are 
summarized in Table 3. The results show that we can group our sample of coun-
tries into two pairs according to the effect of R&D subsidies. The first pair is the 
Czech Republic and Germany. The second pair is Portugal and Bulgaria.  
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T a b l e  3  
The Estimated Average Treatment Effects of R&D Subsidies on the Dependent  
Variables 
Estimate BG CZ DE PT 
Product first to world 0.006 (0.025) 0.079** (0.034) 0.115*** (0.028) 0.015 (0.033) 
Product first to Europe 0.022 (0.027) 0.063* (0.036) 0.068*** (0.026) 0.030 (0.034) 
Product first to country 0.080* (0.041) 0.167*** (0.040) 0.076*** (0.028) 0.123*** (0.032) 
Innovation expenditure 0.046*** (0.011) 0.067*** (0.012) 0.065*** (0.007) 0.057*** (0.005) 
No. of matched obs. (326) (428) (1064) (587) 
Note: Each value shows the average difference between the subsidized and matched non-subsidized firms in 
percentage points. Standard errors are in parentheses. A terisks denote statistical significance in a t-test at the 
1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. The innovation expenditures of German firms are based only on CIS 
2012 as data are not available from CIS 2010. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
 
 R&D subsidies support radical innovation as well as imitations in the first 
pair of countries. In Germany, the subsidies make a major difference in the first-  
-to-the-world innovations: they increase the probability that a firm produces 
a successful product innovation that is new to the world by almost 12 percentage 
points. The average treatment effects on the probability that a firm produces 
a product that is new to the EU or only to its home country are lower. Some first-  
-to-the-world innovations are incentivized by public subsidies in the Czech Re-
public. They raise the probability that a firm produces first-to-the world innova-
tion by 8 percentage points. But unlike in Germany, the main effect of R&D 
subsidies in the Czech Republic is on first-to-the-country innovations.  
 The effect of R&D subsidies is starkly different i Bulgaria and Portugal. In 
these countries, the subsidies make a major differenc  in imitation because the 
average treatment effects on the probability that a firm produces a product that is 
new to the EU, or even new to the world, are close t  zero and statistically insig-
nificant. The R&D subsidies in Portugal increase th probability that a firm pro-
duces a successful product innovation that is new to its home country by almost 
12 percentage points. In Bulgaria, R&D subsidies rai e this probability by only 
8 percentage points and this difference is only margin lly statistically significant. 
Thus, it seems that in these countries, subsidies promote mainly local imitations 
of products already introduced elsewhere, and they do not induce more first-in-    
-the-world or first-in-the-EU innovations.  
 We also explore the impact of R&D subsidies on the firm’s overall inno-
vation expenditure, measured as a share of its revenu . The average treatment 
effect measures the impact of public subsidies on firms’ R&D investment. If the 
subsidized firms spend significantly more on R&D than the non-subsidized 
firms, it means that public subsidies raise the overall spending on R&D, i.e. that 
private subsidies are not fully crowded out by public subsidies. Public R&D 
subsidies increase innovation expenditures by 4 to 7% in each explored country, 
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and the increase is statistically significant at least on a 1% significance level. 
This result confirms that public subsidies do not fully crowd out private funding 
of innovation expenditures in any of our sample countries. This is in line with 
the findings of most of the international studies (Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014; 





 This paper investigated two possible channels through which public R&D 
subsidy might affect private innovation activities. Mainly, we investigated 
whether firms that receive public subsidies engage in more innovative projects. 
In addition, we tested whether public subsidy increases private R&D investment 
or whether it only replaces private investment into R&D activities. We estimate 
the effect of R&D subsidies on a sample of four European countries that are 
diverse in terms of economic development. This enables us to provide a better 
assessment of the effect of R&D subsidies and to show whether there is country-  
-specific heterogeneity in the effects of R&D subsidies. 
 If we look at the effect of R&D subsidies on innovation inputs, measuring 
R&D activity by the share of innovation expenditure on total revenue, we con-
firm that the R&D subsidies increase firms’ R&D expnditures by 4 to 7% of 
their total revenue in all four countries. The absolute value of the effect cannot 
be obtained as our data lack information about the siz  of the subsidies. Still, the 
subsidies motivate firms to spend more on R&D than they would in the absence 
of subsidy programs. This effect is robust across all countries in our sample. 
 However, the question is whether the R&D budgets boosted by subsidies are 
used for developing innovative projects, or rather for introducing products in-
vented elsewhere. Here, we found substantial heterogeneity among the countries 
in our sample. It would be interesting to know more about the sources of this 
heterogeneity. One apparent source may be the differing levels of economic  
development and sophistication of the production process. The firms with less 
sophisticated production may simply increase their productivity with imitation, 
thus sparing themselves from engaging in costly innovations.  
 The Czech Republic is a country in which R&D subsidies encourage radical 
innovations as well as imitations of existing products. Although R&D subsidies do 
not increase the likelihood of new-to-the-world innovations in the Czech Republic 
as much as they do in Germany, the effect is positive. Apart from Germany and 
the Czech Republic, R&D subsidies were found to encourage first-to-the-world 
innovations also in Canada and Switzerland (Bérubé and Mohnen, 2009; Beck, 
Lopes-Bento and Schenker-Wicki, 2016) and research rather than development 
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activities in Belgium (Neicu, Teirlinck and Kelchtermans, 2016). These findings 
suggest that the Czech Republic belongs to a wider group of developed countries 
where R&D subsidies help creating highly innovative products. In this respect, 
the Czech Republic differs from two other sample countries in which R&D sub-
sidies do not promote first-in-the-world or first-in-the-EU innovations: from 
Portugal, a county of comparable size and economic level, and from Bulgaria, 
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A p p e n d i x  A 
 
The Probability Score Model (logit) Used for Matching (part 1) 
Term BG 2010 BG 2012 CZ 2010 CZ 2012 
(Intercept)   –4.091*** (1.568) –8.343*** (1.428) –8.934*** (1.588) –4.876*** (1.377) 
Industry group C2   –0.068 (0.355)   0.06 (0.295)   0.465 (0.314) –0.184 (0.266) 
Industry group C3     0.916*** (0.293) –0.259 (0.302)   0.368 (0.273)   0.148 (0.233) 
Industry group C4     1.052*** (0.275)   0.342 (0.26)   0.52* (0.271)   0.618*** (0.233) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
    0.332 (0.294) 
 
  0.062 (0.3) 
 
  0.077 (0.281) 
 
  0.074 (0.258) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   –0.593 (0.432) –0.726* (0.412) –1.262*** (0.303) –1*** (0.257) 
Headquarters elsewhere  









Log (turnover)     0.08 (0.119)   0.441*** (0.105)  0.413*** (0.106)   0.223** (0.097) 
Size 50 to 249     0.472 (0.303) –0.462* (0.279) –0.217 (0.322)   0.247 (0.293) 
Size 250 and more     0.829 (0.531) –1.002** (0.495) –0.135 (0.44)   0.313 (0.402) 
Local relevant market     0.496* (0.281)   0.061 (0.23)   0.146 (0.214)   0.225 (0.213) 
National relevant market   –0.211 (0.256)   0.45* (0.261)   0.129 (0.394)   0.118 (0.351) 
European relevant market     0.13 (0.282)   0.697*** (0.263)   1.381*** (0.445)   0.315 (0.321) 
Global relevant market     0.667** (0.272) –0.052 (0.243)   0.583*** (0.225)   0.265 (0.206) 
Note: The dependent variable is subsidies. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance in a t-test at 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
 
The Probability Score Model (logit) Used for Matching (part 2) 
Term DE 2010 DE 2012 PT 2010 PT 2012 
(Intercept) –3.128*** (0.556) –3.695*** (1.041) –6.676*** (1.372) –3.56*** (1.328) 
Industry group C2   0.166 (0.2)   0.225 (0.217)   0.083 (0.226) –0.045 (0.231) 
Industry group C3   0.145 (0.19)   0.323 (0.205) –0.028 (0.199) –0.082 (0.207) 
Industry group C4   1.003*** (0.155)   0.762*** (0.168) –0.164 (0.227)   0.05 (0.233) 







  0.075 (0.212) 
 
  0.184 (0.213) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC –1.156*** (0.295) –0.702** (0.291) –0.831*** (0.312) –0.447 (0.318) 
Headquarters elsewhere  









Log (turnover)   0.168** (0.066)   0.123* (0.07)   0.417*** (0.096)   0.141 (0.093) 
Size 50 to 249 –0.618*** (0.191) –0.317 (0.198)   0.099 (0.239)   0.5** (0.245) 
Size 250 and more –0.517* (0.312) –0.475 (0.338)   0.385 (0.413)   1.351*** (0.42) 
Local relevant market   0.192 (0.126)   0.256* (0.138) –0.551** (0.215)   0.073 (0.234) 
National relevant market   0.481* (0.263)   1.054*** (0.295)   0.137 (0.299)   0.198 (0.304) 
European relevant market   0.379* (0.196)   0.071 (0.23) –0.038 (0.228)   0.475* (0.262) 
Global relevant market   0.417** (0.165)   0.366* (0.191)   0.09 (0.197)   0.239 (0.214) 
Note: The dependent variable is subsidies. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance in a t-test at 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 





A p p e n d i x  B 
 
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for Bulgaria in 2010 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1   0.49 (0.25)   0.339*** (0.226)   0.342 (0.225)   0.342 (0.225) 
Industry group C2   0.225 (0.175)   0.119*** (0.105)   0.12 (0.105)   0.12 (0.105) 
Industry group C3   0.137 (0.118)   0.22** (0.173)   0.214 (0.168)   0.214 (0.168) 
Industry group C4   0.148 (0.126)   0.322*** (0.22)   0.325 (0.219)   0.325 (0.219) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.805 (0.157)   0.678*** (0.22)   0.695 (0.212)   0.684 (0.216) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.1 (0.09) 
 
  0.237*** (0.183) 
 
  0.256 (0.191) 
 
  0.231 (0.178) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.082 (0.075)   0.085 (0.078)   0.048 (0.046)   0.085 (0.078) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.013 (0.013) 
 
  0*** (0) 
 
  0 (0) 
 
  0 (0) 
Log(turnover) 13.67 (2.701) 14.46*** (2.896) 14.338 (2.491) 14.443 (2.865) 
Size under 50   0.602 (0.24)   0.373*** (0.236)   0.354 (0.229)   0.376 (0.235) 
Size 50 to 249   0.329 (0.221)   0.449** (0.25)   0.508 (0.25)   0.453 (0.248) 
Size 250 and more   0.069 (0.064)   0.178*** (0.148)   0.138 (0.119)   0.171 (0.142) 
Local relevant market   0.762 (0.182)   0.831* (0.142)   0.789 (0.167)   0.829 (0.142) 
National relevant market   0.687 (0.215)   0.729 (0.199)   0.769 (0.178)   0.726 (0.199) 
European relevant market   0.505 (0.25)   0.669*** (0.223)   0.678 (0.218)   0.667 (0.222) 
Global relevant market   0.262 (0.194)   0.508*** (0.252)   0.514 (0.25)     0.504 (0.25) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
 
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for Bulgaria in 2012 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1   0.438 (0.247)   0.444 (0.249)   0.446 (0.247)   0.446 (0.247) 
Industry group C2   0.258 (0.192)   0.169** (0.141)   0.165 (0.138)   0.165 (0.138) 
Industry group C3   0.153 (0.13)   0.134 (0.117)   0.129 (0.113)   0.129 (0.113) 
Industry group C4   0.151 (0.129)   0.254*** (0.191)   0.259 (0.192)   0.259 (0.192) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.824 (0.145)   0.725** (0.201)   0.703 (0.209)   0.741 (0.192) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.102 (0.092) 
 
  0.183** (0.151) 
 
  0.183 (0.15) 
 
  0.173 (0.143) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.065 (0.061)   0.077 (0.072)   0.082 (0.075)   0.072 (0.067) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.009 (0.009) 
 
  0.014 (0.014) 
 
  0.032 (0.031) 
 
  0.014 (0.014) 
Log(turnover) 13.669 (3.337) 14.708*** (2.506) 14.613 (2.404) 14.622 (2.142) 
Size under 50   0.59 (0.242)   0.43*** (0.247)   0.426 (0.244)   0.439 (0.246) 
Size 50 to 249   0.329 (0.221)   0.423** (0.246)   0.474 (0.249)   0.432 (0.245) 
Size 250 and more   0.082 (0.075)   0.148** (0.127)   0.101 (0.091)   0.129 (0.113) 
Local relevant market   0.761 (0.182)   0.754 (0.187)   0.676 (0.219)   0.755 (0.185) 
National relevant market   0.705 (0.208)   0.838*** (0.137)   0.871 (0.113)   0.835 (0.138) 
European relevant market   0.56 (0.247)   0.789*** (0.168)   0.782 (0.171)   0.784 (0.169) 
Global relevant market   0.319 (0.218)   0.507*** (0.252)   0.542 (0.248)   0.504 (0.25) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
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Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for the Czech Republic in 2010 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1   0.452 (0.248)   0.323*** (0.22)   0.36 (0.23)   0.36 (0.23) 
Industry group C2   0.16 (0.135)   0.153 (0.131)   0.137 (0.118)   0.137 (0.118) 
Industry group C3   0.182 (0.149)   0.243* (0.185)   0.23 (0.177)   0.23 (0.177) 
Industry group C4   0.206 (0.164)   0.28* (0.203)   0.273 (0.199)   0.273 (0.199) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.5 (0.251)   0.423* (0.245)   0.422 (0.244)   0.422 (0.244) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.158 (0.133) 
 
  0.291*** (0.207) 
 
  0.261 (0.193) 
 
  0.261 (0.193) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.251 (0.189)   0.212 (0.168)   0.242 (0.184)   0.242 (0.184) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.091 (0.083) 
 
  0.074 (0.069) 
 
  0.075 (0.069) 
 
  0.075 (0.069) 
Log(turnover) 15.767 (3.785) 16.867*** (3.166) 16.706 (3.245) 16.71 (3.136) 
Size under 50   0.345 (0.227)   0.159*** (0.134)   0.161 (0.135)   0.18 (0.148) 
Size 50 to 249   0.342 (0.226)   0.286 (0.205)   0.323 (0.219)   0.298 (0.209) 
Size 250 and more   0.313 (0.216)   0.556*** (0.248)   0.516 (0.25)   0.522 (0.25) 
Local relevant market   0.596 (0.241)   0.646 (0.23)   0.612 (0.238)   0.652 (0.227) 
National relevant market   0.856 (0.124)   0.942*** (0.055)   0.941 (0.056)   0.944 (0.053) 
European relevant market   0.778 (0.173)   0.963*** (0.036)   0.981 (0.018)   0.981 (0.018) 
Global relevant market   0.42 (0.244)   0.698*** (0.212)   0.686 (0.215)   0.658 (0.225) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
 
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for the Czech Republic in 2012 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1   0.407 (0.242)   0.365 (0.233)   0.366 (0.232)   0.366 (0.232) 
Industry group C2   0.206 (0.164)   0.125*** (0.11)   0.126 (0.11)   0.126 (0.11) 
Industry group C3   0.206 (0.164)   0.22 (0.172)   0.22 (0.172)   0.22 (0.172) 
Industry group C4   0.182 (0.149)   0.29*** (0.207)   0.287 (0.205)   0.287 (0.205) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.494 (0.251)   0.443 (0.248)   0.411 (0.242)   0.445 (0.247) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.126 (0.11) 
 
  0.255*** (0.191) 
 
  0.272 (0.198) 
 
  0.252 (0.188) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.3 (0.211)   0.239* (0.183)   0.244 (0.185)   0.24 (0.182) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.08 (0.074) 
 
  0.063 (0.059) 
 
  0.073 (0.068) 
 
  0.063 (0.059) 
Log(turnover) 16.001 (3.925) 16.757*** (2.797) 16.803 (3.405) 16.749 (2.779) 
Size under 50   0.337 (0.224)   0.169*** (0.141)   0.173 (0.143)   0.169 (0.141) 
Size 50 to 249   0.32 (0.218)   0.333 (0.223)   0.318 (0.217)   0.335 (0.223) 
Size 250 and more   0.344 (0.226)   0.498*** (0.251)   0.509 (0.25)   0.496 (0.25) 
Local relevant market   0.741 (0.192)   0.792 (0.165)   0.814 (0.152)   0.791 (0.165) 
National relevant market   0.886 (0.101)   0.941** (0.056)   0.953 (0.045)   0.941 (0.056) 
European relevant market   0.835 (0.138)   0.925*** (0.069)   0.925 (0.069)   0.925 (0.069) 
Global relevant market   0.523 (0.25)   0.702*** (0.21)   0.663 (0.223)   0.701 (0.21) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 




Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for Germany in 2010 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1 0.373 (0.234) 0.227*** (0.176) 0.225 (0.175) 0.225 (0.175) 
Industry group C2 0.164 (0.138) 0.126* (0.111) 0.127 (0.111) 0.127 (0.111) 
Industry group C3 0.192 (0.156) 0.152* (0.129) 0.144 (0.123) 0.144 (0.123) 
Industry group C4 0.27 (0.197) 0.495*** (0.25) 0.504 (0.25) 0.504 (0.25) 
Not part of an enterprise group 0.564 (0.246) 0.579 (0.244) 0.577 (0.244) 0.59 (0.242) 










Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC 0.092 (0.083) 0.04*** (0.038) 0.048 (0.046) 0.041 (0.039) 
Headquarters elsewhere  









Log(turnover) 9.407 (3.191) 9.668** (4.963) 9.54 (3.104) 9.54 (4.16) 
Size under 50 0.386 (0.237) 0.402 (0.241) 0.414 (0.243) 0.41 (0.242) 
Size 50 to 249 0.381 (0.236) 0.305*** (0.213) 0.306 ( .212) 0.311 (0.214) 
Size 250 and more 0.233 (0.179) 0.293** (0.207) 0.28 (0.202) 0.279 (0.201) 
Local relevant market 0.516 (0.25) 0.566* (0.246) 0.521 (0.25) 0.558 (0.247) 
National relevant market 0.882 (0.105) 0.949*** (0.048) 0.952 (0.046) 0.948 (0.049) 
European relevant market 0.713 (0.205) 0.855*** (0.124) 0.853 (0.125) 0.852 (0.126) 
Global relevant market 0.572 (0.245) 0.752*** (0.187) 0.77 (0.177) 0.747 (0.189) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
 
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for Germany in 2012 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1   0.367 (0.233)   0.244*** (0.185)   0.245 (0.185)   0.245 (0.185) 
Industry group C2   0.157 (0.133)   0.134 (0.116)   0.134 (0.116)   0.134 (0.116) 
Industry group C3   0.175 (0.145)   0.162 (0.136)   0.16 (0.134)   0.16 (0.134) 
Industry group C4     0.301 (0.211)   0.46*** (0.249)   0.461 (0.248)   0.461 (0.248) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.528 (0.25)   0.589* (0.243)   0.562 (0.246)   0.591 (0.242) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.333 (0.222) 
 
  0.315 (0.216) 
 
  0.335 (0.223) 
 
  0.313 (0.215) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.086 (0.079)   0.061 (0.057)   0.073 (0.068)   0.061 (0.057) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.054 (0.051) 
 
  0.035 (0.034) 
 
  0.031 (0.03) 
 
  0.035 (0.034) 
Log(turnover) 16.492 (3.683) 16.603 (4.636) 16.596 (3.843) 16.584 (4.482) 
Size under 50   0.385 (0.237)   0.413 (0.243)   0.424 (0.244)   0.414 (0.243) 
Size 50 to 249   0.376 (0.235)   0.333 (0.223)   0.347 (0.227)   0.334 (0.222) 
Size 250 and more   0.24 (0.183)   0.254 (0.19)   0.228 (0.176)   0.252 (0.188) 
Local relevant market   0.549 (0.248)   0.624** (0.235)   0.612 (0.237)   0.624 (0.235) 
National relevant market   0.866 (0.116)   0.96*** (0.038)   0.962 (0.036)   0.96 (0.038) 
European relevant market   0.776 (0.174)   0.869*** (0.114)   0.869 (0.114)   0.868 (0.114) 
Global relevant market   0.658 (0.225)   0.779*** (0.172)   0.796 (0.163)    0.779 (0.172) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 




Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for Portugal in 2010 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1   0.374 (0.235)   0.426 (0.245)   0.426 (0.245)   0.426 (0.245) 
Industry group C2   0.193 (0.156)   0.17 (0.141)   0.19 (0.154)   0.19 (0.154) 
Industry group C3   0.259 (0.192)   0.244 (0.185)   0.225 (0.174)   0.225 (0.174) 
Industry group C4   0.174 (0.144)   0.16 (0.135)   0.159 (0.134)   0.159 (0.134) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.741 (0.192)   0.567*** (0.246)   0.682 (0.217)   0.651 (0.227) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.152 (0.129) 
 
  0.288*** (0.206) 
 
  0.248 (0.187) 
 
  0.271 (0.198) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.083 (0.076)   0.112 (0.1)   0.047 (0.044)   0.062 (0.058) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.024 (0.023) 
 
  0.032 (0.031) 
 
  0.023 (0.023) 
 
  0.016 (0.015) 
Log(turnover) 14.906 (2.157) 16.072*** (3.599) 15.62 (2.593) 15.621 (2.582) 
Size under 50   0.58 (0.244)   0.311*** (0.215)   0.38 (0.236)   0.364 (0.232) 
Size 50 to 249   0.35 (0.228)   0.455*** (0.249)   0.473 (0.249)   0.496 (0.25) 
Size 250 and more   0.07 (0.065)   0.234*** (0.18)   0.147 (0.126)   0.14 (0.12) 
Local relevant market   0.877 (0.108)   0.808*** (0.156)   0.872 (0.112)   0.857 (0.123) 
National relevant market   0.912 (0.08)   0.929 (0.066)   0.969 (0.03)   0.969 (0.03) 
European relevant market   0.758 (0.184)   0.84*** (0.135)   0.837 (0.136)   0.822 (0.147) 
Global relevant market   0.583 (0.243)   0.724*** (0.2)   0.721 (0.201)   0.702 (0.209) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
 
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of the Covariates (in parentheses)  
for Portugal in 2012 
Variable Control before Treatment before Control after Treatment after 
Industry group C1   0.398 (0.24)   0.424 (0.245)   0.448 (0.247)   0.448 (0.247) 
Industry group C2   0.188 (0.153)   0.196 (0.158)   0.192 (0.155)   0.192 (0.155) 
Industry group C3   0.263 (0.194)   0.216 (0.17)   0.208 (0.165)   0.208 (0.165) 
Industry group C4   0.152 (0.129)   0.164 (0.138)   0.151 (0.128)   0.151 (0.128) 
Not part of an enterprise group   0.723 (0.201)   0.553*** (0.248)   0.599 (0.24)   0.599 (0.24) 
Headquarters in country  
of enterprise 
 
  0.166 (0.139) 
 
  0.285*** (0.204) 
 
  0.268 (0.196) 
 
  0.268 (0.196) 
Headquarters in EU/EFTA/CC   0.089 (0.081)   0.127* (0.111)   0.123 (0.108)   0.123 (0.108) 
Headquarters elsewhere  
in the world 
 
  0.022 (0.021) 
 
  0.035 (0.033) 
 
  0.009 (0.009) 
 
  0.009 (0.009) 
Log(turnover) 14.977 (2.524) 16.097*** (3.268) 15.98 (2.855) 16.003 (2.965) 
Size under 50   0.576 (0.245)   0.285*** (0.204)   0.29 (0.206)   0.29 (0.206) 
Size 50 to 249   0.349 (0.228)   0.455*** (0.249)   0.483 (0.25)   0.479 (0.25) 
Size 250 and more   0.075 (0.069)   0.259*** (0.193)   0.227 (0.176)   0.23 (0.177) 
Local relevant market   0.855 (0.124)   0.841 (0.134)   0.825 (0.144)   0.852 (0.126) 
National relevant market   0.884 (0.103)   0.928** (0.067)   0.953 (0.045)   0.94 (0.056) 
European relevant market   0.759 (0.183)   0.908*** (0.084)   0.909 (0.083)   0.909 (0.083) 
Global relevant market   0.648 (0.229)   0.824*** (0.145)   0.855 (0.124)   0.823 (0.145) 
Note: The two left-hand columns represent the data before matching; the two right-hand columns represent the 
matched data. The columns denoted as “treatment” repres nt firms that have been awarded an R&D subsidy, 
while the columns denoted as “control” represent firms that did not receive any R&D subsidy. The statiically 
significant difference in the means between the controls and treatments is denoted by stars: * for p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
and *** p < 0.01. 
Source: CIS 2010 and 2012, model estimated by the authors. 
